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Abstract 
 
The rapid growth of Internet malicious activities has become a major concern to 
network forensics and security community. With the increasing use of IT 
technologies for managing information there is a need for stronger intrusion 
detection mechanisms. Critical - mission systems and applications require 
mechanisms able to detect any unauthorised activities. An Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS) acts as a necessary element for monitoring traffic packets on 
computer networks, performs analysis to suspicious traffic and makes vital 
decisions. IDSs allow cybercrime forensic specialists to gather useful evidence 
whenever needed. This paper presents the design and development process of a 
Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) solution, which aims at providing an 
effective anomaly based detection model using Chi-Square statistics. One of the 
design objectives in this paper is to minimise the limitations of current statistical 
network forensics and intrusion detection. Throughout the development process of 
this statistical detection model several aspects of the process of building an 
effective detection model are emphasized. These aspects include dataset pre - 
processing and feature selection, network traffic analysis, statistical testing and 
detection model development. The calculated / output statistical figures of this 
model are based on certain threshold values which could be used and / or adjusted 
by a forensic specialist for deciding whether or not a suspicious event took place. 
 
The modelling and development process of this proposed anomaly detection has 
been achieved using various software and development tools. In this paper we 
focus on modelling dynamic anomaly detection using the Chi-square technique. It 
investigates a network traffic dataset collected by CAIDA in 2008 that contains 
signs for denial of service (DoS) attacks called backscatter. The normal dataset 
patterns are analysed to build a profile for the legitimate network traffic. Any 
deviations from these normal profiles will be considered anomalous. The dataset 
was pre - processed using Wireshark and T-Shark, the detection model was 
developed using MATLAB for different variants of denial of services attacks and 
promising results were achieved. 
1.0 Introduction 
The rapid growth of the Internet and WWW has made life faster and easier. On the 
other hand however, new types of crimes made their appearance and made life 
insecure as well. The growing dependence on the Internet has led to the appearance 
of various security problems and unpleasant incidents such as cyber attacks and 
intrusions. An intrusion into a network system is an unauthorised activity that 
compromises its security (such as integrity, confidentiality and availability) 
through a series of illegitimate events. To ensure integrity, confidentiality and 
availability of private information, a computer system or network resource, we 
need a system that monitors events, processes and actions within a system [1] [2]. 
Nowadays intrusion detection systems play a significant role in an organization’s 
security infrastructure. The main focus of this section is to describe intrusion 
detection types, techniques and challenges of current intrusion detection systems. It 
also covers the problems faced during the dataset pre - processing and feature 
selection in terms of the techniques used during this phase. 
 
The idea of intrusion detection was first introduced in 1980 by J. P. Anderson and 
the first intrusion detection model was proposed by D. E. Denning in 1987 [16]. 
The two major types of IDSs are Host-based IDS (HIDS) and Network-based IDS 
(NIDS). The HIDS monitor mostly the events on a host computer system, while the 
NIDS monitor the activity of a computer network system. Intrusion detection can 
be classified into two detection methods: misuse detection and anomaly detection. 
Misuse detection or signature based IDS can detect intrusion based on known 
attack patterns and familiar intrusive scenarios. Anomaly intrusion detection is 
based on an assumption that the behaviour of an intruder is different from that of 
normal users. It targets intrusions by identifying the deviation from normal 
activities behaviour and alerts from potential unseen violations and/or attacks. 
Anomaly detection systems are divided into two types: static and dynamic.  Static 
anomaly detectors assume that part of the system being monitored will not change 
such as network protocols. Network traffic data or audit records represent 
appropriate scenarios for dynamic anomaly detection systems [17] [18]. 
 
One of the major security threats is denial of service (DoS) which often 
compromises the availability of a system or network. DoS attack including its 
distributed approach is an attempt to exhaust a network or computer resource, so to 
become unavailable to its legitimate users. Such resources could be network 
bandwidth, computing power or e-Commerce services [5]. DoS can be achieved by 
flooding a particular router or network or with an overwhelming traffic and/or by 
generating huge number of service requests to a server over short period of time. 
This makes resource and/or services unavailable to legitimate users. Many of the 
current security measures are no longer considered sufficient to provide reliable 
network security, especially against zero error malicious activities and intrusions. 
There are two basic classes of DoS attacks: logic attacks and resource attacks. 
Logic attacks tend to exploit current software flaws to degrade or crash a particular 
software system. However, in resource attacks the victim computer’s CPU or 
memory, or network bandwidth are overwhelmed by a large amount of useless 
traffic and / or requests. There are many methods used to implement denial of 
service attack. The most commonly methods are TCP SYN flooding, ICMP 
flooding and RST attack [6] [7] [8] [15]. 
 
In this paper we investigate a network security denial of service dataset (called 
backscatter 2008) captured by the CAIDA to develop our proposed detection 
model. In backscatter attack, attackers spoof the source IP addresses of live 
systems selected randomly. The victim node responds to the spoofed source IP 
addresses. This response behaviour captured by the CAIDA is called backscatter. 
This dataset does not have traffic between the attacker and the victims. It has only 
reflections or responses from the victim to the spoofed IP addresses. Therefore, this 
dataset contains information that is useful for investigating a recent denial-of-
service attack [9]. 
 
In anomaly detection, normally we have a long - term profile for each user or 
network system and then compare this profile with recent system events or 
incoming data. An anomaly event is signalled when there is a larger departure 
between the observed profile and normal profile. Network traffic data of normal 
profile / events are required for training the normal profile and other data events 
(normal and abnormal) for testing purposes [3]. Firstly, the dataset is 
decompressed using LZO utility into PCAP format. Then, Wireshark is used to 
visualise the dataset and T-Shark to convert the dataset format to CSV. Finally, the 
dataset in CSV format is used as an input to Matlab to develop the intrusion 
detection model. An intrusion detection system should be able to identify a 
substantial percentage of intrusions while maintaining the false alarms rate at an 
acceptable level. The major challenge for intrusion detection systems is the base 
rate fallacy. This is due to the difficulty in maintaining the standard high rate of 
detections with low rate of false alarms [4]. The base rate fallacy represents both, 
the false positives and false negatives. 
2.0 System Model 
In this section we introduce our proposed detailed architecture for our intrusion 
detection model. The following figure shows a typical generalized architecture of 
an intrusion detection model. Firstly, the model accepts a network traffic dataset as 
an input and extracts the TCP flags of each input packet [14]. A frequency 
distribution is generated and split into four categories as the number of RST, SYN-
ACK, ICMP packets per second plus other TCP packets. The average number of 
packets (for each category) per second is calculated. 
  
Figure 1: Generalised architecture of Intrusion Detection 
 
To test the model, samples of three minutes of network traffic are extracted from a 
3 hours of backscatter-2008 dataset. The dataset has been sampled into 60 samples 
of three minutes. All samples represent the observed data and are categorised based 
on the TCP flags. After the three minutes sample categorization the model uses the 
Chi-square test to perform anomaly detection. In this step a chi-square value is 
computed from the observed and expected data, and then the chi-square computed 
value is compared with a chi-square tabulated value. An intrusion alarm is raised 
when the chi-square computed value is greater than the chi-square tabulated value 
[11]. Figure 2 shows all these test calculation procedures. The proposed model for 
the intrusion detection is depicted in this figure. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Chi-square Detection Model 
 
As part of the detection model training process the data pre-processing stage splits 
the input dataset into smaller three minutes durations of PCAP format. In this 
phase the TCP packets are analysed. Only TCP flags information in the packets are 
processed and all other information from the dataset is removed. Using the T-Shark 
utility all worthless data is eradicated, but the remaining data is then converted into 
CSV format. The CSV format data is manipulated through MATLAB and only the 
useful features (TCP flags information) are extracted. Next, a frequency population 
distribution is generated for the whole data. This distribution includes two 
columns: the first column contains the categories RTS, SYN-ACK, ICMP and 
OTHER, and the second column contains the average number of packets per 
second. This generated data distribution is then stored in a data storage. 
 
To test the detection model, and after data pre-processing and feature extraction 
phase, the data is passed to the next stage of data distribution. In this stage, all the 
TCP packets are categorized into four categories (RST, SYN-ACK, ICMP, Other). 
Then the average number of packets per second is calculated for each category. 
Another distribution is then generated, but this time it is the sample distribution. 
This sample distribution is also called observed data entries in chi-square testing. 
As part of the testing process the chi-square calculation is performed on the sample 
distribution against the stored population distribution. A chi-square value is 
calculated and then passed to the decision phase. In the decision phase the chi-
square calculated value is compared with the chi-square tabulated value, which is 
also called critical value [10]. If the chi-square calculated value is greater than the 
critical value then an intrusion / anomaly alarm is raised. 
3.0 Method 
In the HIDS and NIDS systems a statistical based anomaly detection technique is 
used to depict the expected normal behaviour of an event [12]. The statistical based 
anomaly detection techniques overcome the problems associated with string based 
and rule based misuse detection. Univariate based HIDSs and NIDSs use one 
specific behaviour measure, however many intrusions use multiple factors and 
more events having impact on multiple behaviour measures. Thus, a multivariate 
anomaly detection technique is required to detect such intrusions. Some of these 
techniques are Hotelling T², multivariate cumulative sum (MCUSUM), and 
multivariate exponentially weighted moving average (MEWMA) [3]. These 
multivariate statistical methods can be applied for intrusion detection and for 
examining anomalous behaviour of particular events. These techniques, however, 
require computationally intensive procedures and processes in order to deal with a 
huge amount of high - dimensional data. In general, anomaly intrusion detection 
demands a minimum delay of processing of each event to ensure an early detection 
of any anomalies [3] [13]. Therefore, a robust multivariate anomaly detection 
technique with minimum computation cost such as Chi-Square testing would be an 
appropriate choice for intrusion detection. 
 
Chi-Square Goodness-of-Fit Test Procedure: Chi-Square goodness-of-fit test is 
used to find out how much the observed values of a particular given sample are 
significantly different from the expected values of the distribution [19]. It is used to 
compare the observed sample distribution with the expected probability 
distribution. Chi-square tests theories about the whole distribution (not an 
individual parameter – unlike Z and t tests) rather than a single statistic from within 
that distribution. In chi-square we reject the null hypothesis when there is a 
difference between the observed and the expected frequencies. To develop the chi-
square hypotheses test for the distribution of relevant variables, one must ensure 
that the following assumptions are fulfilled [11] [19]. 
• All the expected frequencies are either 1 or greater than 1. 
• At most 20 percent of the frequencies are less than 5. 
• A sample of data is drawn from a simple - random sampling method so 
that each possible sample of a given size is equally likely to be the one 
selected. 
The null and alternative hypotheses for the test are: 
 
Ho: the relevant variable has the specified distribution, and 
H1: the relevant variable does not have the specified distribution. 
 
Observed and Expected Frequencies: The numbers of occurrences obtained from 
the dataset are called observed frequencies and are denoted by O. The expected 
frequencies we expect to obtain from the dataset distribution if the null hypothesis 
is true are denoted by E [10] [11]. The expected frequency for a category is 
calculated as follows: 
 
E = np (or nf) 
 
where n is the size of the sample, p is the probability or proportion of that category 
if the null hypothesis is true and f is the relative frequency. Ho is rejected, when the 
observations O are sufficiently different from the expected values E. 
 
Degree of Freedom for goodness-of-Fit Test [10] [11]: In the goodness of fit test, 
the degrees of freedom (df) is calculated as follows: 
 
     df = k-1  
 
where k represents the number of categories in the dataset. 
 
The next step in the procedure is the selection of significance level α, so to test 
whether or not the assumptions for the expected frequencies are satisfied. The 
significance level α represents the max risk we are willing to take in rejecting Ho 
when it is in fact true. For this purpose of chi-square testing the significance level α 
value is decided based on the computer vulnerability [10]. For highly secured 
networks this value is selected to be small so the results are statistically significant. 
The Chi-Square test statistic for a goodness of fit test is calculated as follows: 
 
 
  
where O is the observed frequency for a category, E is the Expected frequency for 
a category and k is the number of observations in the sample (or number of 
categories in the dataset). 
 
In this test statistic we check the χ² calculated value with χ² tabulated value, if the 
χ² calculated value is greater than the tabulated value at the significance level α 
than we reject the null hypothesis Ho. This means that the observed value cannot be 
fitted in the distribution. 
4.0 Experiments and Results 
In this section we describe the main steps of experiments carried out. This includes 
the data sampling, time slots selection and relevant variables categorisation in 
terms of TCP and ICMP packets. Also, this section describes the achieved results 
in terms of the detection model outputs. 
 
Chi-Square Goodness-of-Fit Test Calculation: In this experiment we have the 
three hour Backscatter-2008 dataset. Table 1 shows a sample of this data set in 60 
time slots, each with 3 minute time slot. Table 1 also depicts the number of packets 
average per seconds, its categories based on TCP flags set and ICMP packets. 
 
 
 
Table 1: Time Distribution of Backscatter-2008 Data Set 
 
For the Chi-square test calculation, a distribution for the whole dataset based on the 
TCP flag bit-set packets and the ICMP packets was produced, as shown in table 2a. 
The average packets per second for each category of packets were listed in table 2a 
as well. Table 2b shows the relative frequencies / ratios of the distribution needed 
for the remaining calculation. The relative frequencies can be easily calculated by 
dividing the average number of each category by the total numbers of categories. 
  
                                                                                                                                                         
In order to test the model’s ability to detect any anomaly in any of the three minute 
slots, for example slot no. T51, we can derive the following hypothesis for this test 
as follows: 
 
Ho: the T51 has the specified distribution i.e. there is no anomaly in T51, and 
H1: the T51 does not have specified distribution i.e. there is anomaly in T51. 
 
 
 
Table 3: The χ² test calculation for T51 time slot 
 
The χ² goodness-of-test statistic is 
 
 
 
Let us perform the hypothesis test at 5 % significance level so (α=0.05). There are 
4 types of categories in the test so k = 4 and the degree of freedom df = 4 - 1 = 3. 
By checking the chi-square table and using α=0.05 and df = 3, we get the chi-
square tabulated χ²0.05 value as 7.82. So, the chi-square calculated value is greater 
than the chi-square tabulated value, therefore we reject the null hypothesis Ho and 
accept the alternative hypothesis H1. This means that the time slot T51 is 
anomalous. In others words, we can safely say that there is denial-of-service attack 
during the T51 slot. It also means this that the observed entry is different from the 
expected entry [3] [19]. Nong Ye and Qiang Chen [13] stated that “the large 
difference between the observed and expected frequencies is an intrusion”. The 
difference between observed and expected frequencies for the T51 can be depicted 
in figure 3. 
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Figure 3: The differences between observed and expected frequencies in T51 slot. 
 
Figure 3 shows that there is a clear difference between the observed and expected 
frequencies of the RST and SYN-ACK. This is an indication of a SYN flood attack 
and RST attack during the time slot 51. The purpose of testing T51 slot was to 
check for any anomalous events in this portion of backscatter-2008 dataset. The 
backscatter-2008 dataset for non - intrusive events during the time slot T42 has 
been tested as well. The calculated chi-square value is less than the critical value, 
so we cannot reject the null hypothesis H₀ for this particular time slot. The 
acceptance of the null hypothesis means that there is no intrusive traffic in 
backscatter-2008 data during the time slot T42. This is due to the fact that there is a 
little difference between the observed and expected values, so we conclude that 
there is no intrusion at the T42 time slot. The calculated chi-square values for the 
backscatter-2008 dataset for all time slots from time slot T1 to T60 is shown in 
figure 4. 
  
Figure 4: The detection model output 
 
In figure 4 the X-axis represents the calculated chi-square values of the 
backscatter-2008 data set during the time slots T1 to T60. For the purpose of 
simplicity the large calculated chi-square values have been capped at 250. The chi-
square tabulated threshold value is represented by the red vertical line which 
intersects with the X-axis at 7.82. All the chi-square values that are greater than the 
threshold value of 7.82 represent anomalous time slots. 
5.0 Conclusion 
In this paper we explored the concept of chi-square statistic in terms of detecting 
anomalous activities taking place in a computer network traffic and CAIDA 
backscatter-2008 dataset in particular. The paper also described the unique nature 
of the CAIDA dataset and explained the advantages of chi-square statistic in 
intrusion detection. Backscatter-2008 dataset analysis is quite challenging, as this 
data does not contain any direct traffic between the attacker(s) and victim(s). The 
unique property of the dataset is that it is only one way traffic as it has only 
reflection or responses from the victim node / network. The developed model, 
experiments and results analysis confirmed that chi-square is an interesting choice 
for statistical testing to detect various attacks in computer network systems. 
 
The denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, such as TCP-SYN flood, ICMP flood and 
RST attack have been investigated. DoS properties have been studied and analysed 
through extracted features from network traffic and protocol header data such as 
TCP flags. Various software and tools were used including Wireshark, T-shark, 
LZO utility to pre-process the dataset. Matlab was used to develop the detection 
model and for coding development and implementation of chi-square statistic 
solution. The intrusion detection model performance depends on the input data 
distribution and its categorization. If the population distribution has been 
developed through proper statistical approach then the detection model should 
work well. 
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